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Why continuous variables?
Practical considerations: nice alternative to qubit-based crypto
states: coherent states (same as most implementations of BB84), but with a
natural encoding of information (phase space)
homodyne detection: ”off-the-shelf”, compared to single-photon detectors
(developed on purpose)
Performances
high rate for metropolitan range (better than DV)
but less suited for very long distances (on-off detectors of DV act as a very good
filter)
Why haven’t CV taken over quantum crypto yet?
probably (in part) because of a number of theoretical difficulties
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Main theoretical difficulties in CV quantum cryptography
A specific formalism
qubits are replaced by optical modes (∞− dim Hilbert spaces)
states described in phase space (R2) instead of Bloch sphere
two types of measurements: homodyne and heterodyne, with outcomes in R or
R
2 =⇒ the defining difference
From CV to bits
Need to go from ~x ∈ Rn to k ∈ Fn2
truncation (to get rid of unbounded variables)
discretization (to get bits)
Infinite dimension
usual de Finetti fails =⇒ problem for general attacks
parameter estimation of unbounded quantities =⇒ pb even for collective attacks
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Difficulty 1: a specific formalism (states)
qubits are replaced by optical modes (∞− dim Hilbert space) spanned the Fock
basis of photon-number states: {|0〉, |1〉, . . . , |n〉, . . .}
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) replaced by
√
1− |λ|2(|00〉+λ|11〉+λ2|22〉+ · · ·+λn|nn〉+ · · · )
=⇒ two-mode squeezed vacuum states, defined for any |λ| < 1
the single-mode states are described in phase space by their Wigner function
W (x , p) (= quasi-probability distribution over R2), x and p are called the
quadratures
the states of interest are Gaussian (i.e. W is Gaussian)
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Uncertainty relation: ∆x∆p ≥ 1 (constraint on covariance matrix)
Anthony Leverrier (INRIA) QCrypt 2017 8 / 26
Difficulty 1: a specific formalism (measurements)
each single-mode state is described by its Wigner function ρ↔W (x , p)∫
W (x , p)dp and
∫
W (x , p)dx are genuine probability density functions (normalized,
≥ 0)
Homodyne detection
homodyne measurement of x quadrature: sample according to
∫
W (x , p)dp
homodyne measurement of p quadrature: sample according to
∫
W (x , p)dx
They play a role similar to measurements in the computational or Hadamard basis for
qubit states.
Heterodyne detection (more symmetric)
mix the optical mode with vacuum on a balanced beamsplitter, measure a
different quadrature for each output mode =⇒ (x , p) ∈ R2




=⇒ α ∈ C
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Difficulty 1: a specific formalism (EB CV protocols)
Gaussian protocols
Alice prepares two-mode squeezed states |λ〉, keeps one mode, sends the other one to
Bob
protocols vary as function of measurements
homodyne/homodyne: similar to BBM92, requires sifting
heterodyne/homodyne
heterodyne/heterodyne: the most symmetric version
EB vs PM: Homodyning a mode of 2-mode squeezed vacuum state prepares a
squeezed state for the 2nd mode; heterodying prepares a coherent state.
Reverse reconciliation (Grosshans, Grangier 2002)
Bob’s measured data forms the raw key
seems strange to people used to BB84, necessary to tolerate ≥ 50% losses
but same thing for BB84 if Alice and Bob postselect on Bob’s detectors clicking!!
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Difficulty 1: a specific formalism (PM CV protocols)
Protocol (PM) State (PM) Bob’s
preparation Modul. measurement
Cerf-Levy squeezed Gaussian homo
-van Assche
2001
Weedbrook et al coherent Gaussian hetero
2004
(also MDI CVQKD
Pirandola et al Nat Phot 2015)
Grosshans coherent Gaussian homo
-Grangier 2002
Usenko - coherent Gaussian 1D homo
Grosshans 2015
Garcia-Patron squeezed Gaussian hetero
-Cerf 2009
Filip 2008 thermal Gaussian homo/hetero
Madsen et al 2013 squeezed Gaussian + homo/hetero
add. Gauss.
Fiurásek-Cerf 2012 coherent Gaussian homo/hetero
Walk et al 2013 Gauss. postsel
and many other with non-Gaussian modulations (e.g. discrete) . . .
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Difficulty 1: a specific formalism (PM CV protocols)
Protocol (PM) State (PM) Bob’s
preparation Modul. measurement
Cerf-Levy squeezed Gaussian homo
-van Assche
2001
Weedbrook et al coherent Gaussian hetero
2004
(also MDI CVQKD
Pirandola et al Nat Phot 2015)
Grosshans coherent Gaussian homo
-Grangier 2002
Usenko - coherent Gaussian 1D homo
Grosshans 2015
Garcia-Patron squeezed Gaussian hetero
-Cerf 2009
Filip 2008 thermal Gaussian homo/hetero
Madsen et al 2013 squeezed Gaussian + homo/hetero
add. Gauss.
Fiurásek-Cerf 2012 coherent Gaussian homo/hetero
Walk et al 2013 Gauss. postsel
for all Gaussian protocols, we have a conjecture for the asymptotic key rate (= rate
against Gaussian collective attacks)
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Difficulty 2: from CV to bits
(Naturally done by any physical detector: always outputs a number on 12 or 24 bits!)
∆ : R→ {0, 1}d , d bits
pb 1: some intervals are ∞: is it ok? postselect or bound probability?
pb 2: discretization breaks the symmetry of the protocol: bad
ex: EUR for discretized quadratures [Furrer et al., JMP 2014]
Xδ, Pδ: discretized quadratures for A system with bin size δ. For ρABE ,















generalization to smooth entropies =⇒ security of homodyne/homodyne protocol
against general attacks [Furrer et al., PRL 2013] [Furrer PRA 2015]
experimental demonstration: [Gehring et al., Nature Comm 2015]
But asymptotic rate below that corresponding to Gaussian attacks
Also used for “Beyond QKD” protocols, e.g. OT in noisy storage [Furrer et al.,
arXiv:1708.00048]
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Difficulty 3: infinite dimension (unbounded variables)
Assume collective attacks, ρ⊗n, is it possible to estimate the CM?
A simpler problem
Given x1, . . . , xn ∈ R i.i.d. with unknown distribution, estimate 〈x2〉
random sampling doesn’t work, e.g.,
xi =
{
0 with prob 1− ε
±C with prob ε/2
one has 〈x2〉 = C 2ε but requires to sample a fraction ≥ 1− ε
Solution: rotational symmetry
Apply random R ∈ O(n) to ~x : ~x → R~x ; sample first k coordinates
=⇒ concentration of measure gives tight bounds
This technique can be applied to CVQKD for protocols with sufficient symmetry
(hetero/hetero): =⇒ bound on CM and security against collective attacks [AL PRL
2015]
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Difficulty 3: infinite dimension (general attacks)
de Finetti: security against coll. attacks =⇒ general attacks
2 versions: “exponential dF” [Renner, Nat Phys 2007]; “dF reduction”
[Christandl, Koenig, Renner PRL 2009]
requires finite dimension
idea: perform energy test to bound the dimension of the remaining state with high
probability
results
energy test + perm. invariance =⇒ most modes are close to finite-dim states
=⇒ CV version of exponential de Finetti [Renner-Cirac PRL 2009]
energy test + rot. inv. =⇒ all the modes are close to (log n)-dim states
=⇒ CV version of dF reduction [AL, Garcia-Patron, Renner, Cerf, PRL 2013]
energy test + rot. inv. + Gaussian de Finetti reduction [AL PRL 2017]
=⇒ sufficient to consider Gaussian collective attacks, compatible with
finite-size analysis
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Summary so far
2 protocols are secure
homodyne/homodyne with EUR, but loose bound on the key rate
hetero/hetero, tight key rate but requires active symmetrization
Two ways to get a bound on Hεmin(X |E )ρn
With EUR:
I discretize =⇒ Xδ,Pδ












with Gaussian de Finetti:
1 symmetrize in phase-space =⇒ restrict to ρn = ρ⊗nGauss
2 equipartition property: Hεmin(Xδ|E)ρ⊗nGauss ≈ nH(Xδ|E )ρGauss
3 H(Xδ|E )ρGauss = H(Xδ)− χ(Xδ;E )ρGauss
4 estimation of CM =⇒ upper bound on χ(Xδ;E )ρGauss
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(Some) open questions in CV QKD
better EUR?
symmetrization procedure: necessary?
other Gaussian protocols: can we prove that Gaussian attacks are optimal?
imperfect modulation: how to deal with it?
discrete modulation: 2-state has been done, going beyond linear channels?
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Better EUR?
Would also be useful for other CV quantum crypto protocols: bit commitment, OT
=⇒ avoid to discretize too early in the protocol (less symmetries =⇒ loose bounds)
Idea 1: use mutual info
Hmin(X |E) is ill-defined if X is real, but χ(X ;E) is well-defined and bounded.
For given CM, χ(X ;E) is maximized for Gaussian state [Wolf, Giedke, Cirac PRL
2005] [Garcia-Patron, Cerf PRL 2006] [Navascues, Grosshans, Acin PRL 2006]
Can we get a useful UR with mutual information? exists for classical info [Hall
PRL 1995]
Idea 2: see G. De Palma’s preprint today arXiv: 1709.04921
“Uncertainty relations with quantum memory for the Wehrl entropy”
Wehrl entropy = differential Shannon entropy of the outcome of a heterodyne
measurement
S(Z |B) + S(Z |C) ≥ n ln 4
with S(Z |B) conditional Shannon entropy
can we exploit such quantities for a security proof?
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Symmetrization procedure
The issue
To apply de Finetti, the state must be rotation invariant (protocol covariant wrt U(n)).
this can be enforced if A and B should U ∼ U(n) and perform ~x → U~x ; ~y → Ū~y
very costly to choose a random U: complexity = O(n3) (random Gaussian +
Gram-Schmidt)
but same issue for BB84 with random permutation and cost O(n log n)
for BB84, we know that symmetrization isn’t necessary (from EUR)
same for CV?
Solution?
the whole protocol doesn’t have to be covariant wrt U(n)
we only need to bound Hεmin(X |E)ρn
Idea: use Portman’s technique to decompose the QKD protocols in 2 steps
[arXiv: 1705.10595]
1 state distribution + measurement =⇒ “quantum min-entropy resource”
2 + classical postprocessing (ec, pa) =⇒ secret key
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Other Gaussian protocols (1/2)
Protocol (PM) State (PM) Bob’s
preparation Modul. measurement
Cerf-Levy squeezed Gaussian homo
-van Assche
2001
Weedbrook et al coherent Gaussian hetero
2004
(also MDI CVQKD
Pirandola et al Nat Phot 2015)
Grosshans coherent Gaussian homo
-Grangier 2002
Usenko - coherent Gaussian 1D homo
Grosshans 2015
Garcia-Patron squeezed Gaussian hetero
-Cerf 2009
Filip 2008 thermal Gaussian homo/hetero
Madsen et al 2013 squeezed Gaussian + homo/hetero
add. Gauss.
Fiurásek-Cerf 2012 coherent Gaussian homo/hetero
Walk et al 2013 Gauss. postsel
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Other Gaussian protocols (2/2)
current EUR only works if Alice performs homodyne detection (protocol with
squeezed states)
alternative: Gaussian optimality + de Finetti: requires bound on the CM
Estimation of the CM
note that there are 2 CM: one for ρ, and one for measurement outcomes (x , y)
(not equivalent for PM protocols)
“manageable” if protocol sufficiently symmetric [AL, PRL 2015]
seems harder but doable for GG02
but unclear whether the Gaussian de Finetti can be adapted =⇒ problem for
finite size setting
Remark: for protocols with Gaussian modulation, one can easily compute the CM of
the quantum state in the EB version from the CM of the classical data in the PM
version
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Imperfect modulation
For all the PM protocols, one assumes that Alice
prepares the states with a Gaussian modulation
=⇒ never the case in practice!
=⇒ No really satisfying answer at the moment!
Only analysis: Jouguet et al, Phys. Rev. A 86, 032309 (2012)
idea: bound trace distance between ideal state sent by Alice and true state
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results: ‖ρ− σ‖tr ≈ 10−10 for “reasonable” parameters: 28 × 28 bins for Cartesian
modulation; 2000× 2000 for polar modulation
Open questions: 1) make the analysis composable; 2) intuitively approximate
modulation should be sufficient
Anthony Leverrier (INRIA) QCrypt 2017 24 / 26
Discrete modulation
A solution is to switch to discrete modulation! [Lorenz,
Korolkova, Leuchs (2004), Namiki, Hirano (2006), Zhao,
Heid, Rigas, Lütkenhaus (2009), AL, Grangier (2009), Sych,
Leuchs (2010), Bradler, Weedbrook (2017)...]
=⇒ easier to implement
=⇒ better for error correction
unclear how to use EUR; what about collective attacks (+ de Finetti)?
2 covariance matrices
A and B implement the PM protocol: they have data ~x ∈ {0, 1}n, ~y ∈ Rn
(ignoring many issues) they can estimate the CM of (~x , ~y)
pb: the bound on χ(Y ;E) depends on the CM of ρ in the EB protocol!
unknown how to relate CM(ρ) and CM(~x , ~y), except for nice quantum channels,
or 2-state protocol ( 6= Gaussian protocols)
Note that Zhao et al (PRA 2009) manage to study the 2-state protocol in asymptotic
limit (assuming CM is known)
Idea: extend approach of Coles/Winick/Lütkenhaus (reliable numerical key rates) to
CV?
Anthony Leverrier (INRIA) QCrypt 2017 25 / 26
Conclusion and perspectives
CV protocols are attractive for implementation reasons
but their security is quite involved (infinite dimension, unbounded variables,
discretization, truncation...)
challenges for theorists
find better/tighter entropic uncertainty relations
show that active symmetrization isn’t necessary
prove the security of all Gaussian protocols, eg GG02
security of 4-state protocol (rate  2-state protocol)
Thanks!
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